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Lieutenant-Colonel Bert Hoffmeister provedhimself in Sicily. In the Campaign to wrest
the Italian island from the Axis Powers, he fought
with skill and courage. Both were important;
commanders not only have to be technically
competent at managing the men and resources
under their command, they also have to able to
do it when shells are falling and soldiers are
dying. In the combat crucible of Sicily,
Hoffmeister demonstrated his ability to do both.
He had come a long way since joining the
Canadian Active Service Force in 1939. During
his first twelve months in England, he floundered
as the Canadian Army struggled to mobilize itself
almost overnight. As he was not learning much
that would help him lead men into battle, his
personal anxiety heightened, ultimately
culminating in a nervous breakdown in January-
February 1941. After his recovery, he toiled as a
company commander, gathering what skills he
could on numerous Field Training and
Command Post Exercises2  as the army gradually
got better at training itself. For four months,
starting in December 1941, he continued with
his on-the-job training regimen as a staff learner
in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade (2 CIB).
But his formal military education really only took
off when he attended the Canadian Junior War
Staff Course (April-August 1942). At the Royal
Military College in Kingston, he learned a
formalized manner for planning, organizing,
monitoring and executing military operations –
a skill set that he put to good use after he became
Commanding Officer of his beloved Seaforth
Highlanders of Canada in October 1942.
Numerous training exercises throughout 1942
and the first half of 1943, including two sets of
amphibious exercises in Scotland, helped hone
his hard won skills prior to Operation HUSKY,
the Allied invasion of Sicily. By the time the
Seaforths set sail for the Mediterranean as part
of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID)
attached to General Sir Bernard Law
Montgomery’s famous Eighth Army, Hoffmeister
was as ready as any battalion commander could
have been for his first battlefield test.
For nearly nine days following initial landings
at Pachino Beach on 10 July 1943, the Seaforths
pushed inland through Modica, Ragusa,
Grammichelle, Caltagirone and Valguarnera.
The heat was oppressive, but the Italian
resistance was light, and the battalion managed
to cover most of the hilly and rocky terrain on
foot, and quickly.3  Eventually though, reluctant
Italian opposition gave way to determined
German delaying action as the enemy attempted
to buy time for a withdrawal of its forces from
the island. Then the fighting got hard.
In a valley near Valguarnera, Hoffmeister very
nearly marched his entire battalion into an
ambush of German mortar and machine gun
Because he [Hoffmeister] was there, I no more thought of running and hiding….I just felt,
“he’ll take care of me.” He’s there too.  It’s just like flying in an airplane; you’ve got to
have confidence in the pilot. If the plane falls, he falls too. You just felt, if he’s here I guess
I should be too; otherwise I might have crawled under a truck or something.1
Sergeant Denis Meade, MM on being Lieutenant-Colonel Bert
Hoffmeister’s Radio Operator during the Sicilian Campaign.
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2fire. Just as he was deploying his companies to
the high ground, away from the vulnerable valley
floor, the Germans opened fire. The ambush
caught Hoffmeister’s lead company in a vicious
cross fire that immediately felled 18 soldiers.
The unit chaplain recounted the carnage in his
diary:
I had a good view of the accuracy…of the enemy’s
aim. Vicious bursts of flame & clouds of dust,
dirt and rock flew into the air to the left and
right of us….Wounded were being brought out
and I attended the dying. Boys I had known well
were among the victims, torn and bleeding
beyond all hope of recovery. Mortars continued
to drop steadily and with nerve wracking
accuracy.4
Getting the trapped company out of the killing
zone was going to be difficult.
In the middle of the mêlée, Hoffmeister
moved about the battlefield, reconnoitering
positions for observation (to find the enemy) and
fire (to shoot at the enemy), directing the action
to foil the ambush and extract the trapped
company. Neutralizing the German action
required the coordination of friendly artillery
and mortar fire on the enemy infantry, as well
as the forward positioning of the battalion’s anti-
tank weapons to counter German tanks.5  By
using the tried and true method of firing on the
enemy to “keep their heads down” (and prevent
them from firing back)6  and manoeuvre,
Hoffmeister eventually extricated his forward
company and withdrew them from the enemy’s
killing zone. In short, he found the enemy, he
won the firefight, and he moved his troops to
safety. This was simple to say, difficult to do;
but Hoffmeister did it at considerable personal
risk. It was not a quick affair either. Several
intense and harrowing hours passed before the
battalion was able to disengage itself with most
of its members – and its morale – still intact.
Aside from the casualties, this particular
action was significant for the fact that it
demonstrated Hoffmeister’s fondness for being
well forward and conducting his own
reconnaissance. Why did he do business that
way? Without question, he wanted to get a better
appreciation of the situation from which to
anticipate problems (like where the enemy might
strike next) and make tactical decisions (like how
to counter the next enemy move). But his actions
also had another important effect: stiffening the
morale of his subordinates. In the course of
conducting his own reconnaissance, Hoffmeister
had to dodge tank and small arms fire.7  Many
soldiers witnessed Hoffmeister’s apparent lack
of concern for his own safety, and undoubtedly
passed their observations on to their mates.8
Hoffmeister realized, or came quickly to
realize, the effect of a leader’s personal courage
in war. Syd Thomson (who later commanded an
Lieutenent-Colonel B.M.
Hoffmeister, commanding officer
of the Seaforth Highlanders of
Canada, August 1943.
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3infantry battalion under Hoffmeister during the
Battle of Ortona) said it best:
During a sticky battle, morale is as important,
if not more important than good tactics. On the
scale of 1 to 10, morale will go from 4 to 9 just
by the appearance of a senior commander in
the line when and where the bullets are flying.
Bert understood this.9
Hoffmeister expected this sort of example
from all his officers and showed no mercy for
those in whom it was lacking. One officer who
cowered during the engagement at Valguarnera
– taking his subordinates with him in hasty
retreat – Hoffmeister relieved immediately after
the event.10  That officer may very well have been
capable of making good tactical decisions; he
had probably done so in training. But this was
war – an infantryman’s war; it took more than
sound management skills, regimental pride or
charisma to make organizations work. It took
courage. Sections, platoons, companies and
battalions were comprised of individual soldiers
who were subject to the same fears and
apprehensions as any other human beings. Yet
soldiers in combat had to face those fears more
intensely, and more often. Good commanders,
like Hoffmeister, carried soldiers beyond their
apprehensions and convinced them that they
were all on the “same airplane.”
The Battle for the Sicilian mountain town of
Agira provides another useful study of
Hoffmeister as a battlefield commander learning
his craft. By 21 July, the Eighth Army’s drive
north had stalled as a result of strong German
resistance on the Catania Plain, and Montgomery
accordingly adjusted his plan to unhinge the
German defenders at Etna. To set the conditions
for a 30th Corps breakthrough west of Mount
Etna, Montgomery ordered all Eighth Army
formations to adopt a defensive posture (to avoid
casualties they could not afford) and tasked
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds’ 1 CID “to
continue without restraint directed on
Adrano.”11  The initial stage of the 1 CID eastward
drive saw 1 CIB advance from Leonforte to the
eastern edge of Nissoria between 23 and 26 July.
From there, 2 CIB took the lead.12  (see map on
next page) Its commander, Brigadier Chris Vokes
planned for the PPCLI to capture the first
ridgeline (codenamed “Lion”) east of the town of
Nissoria and advance to the next set of high
features, known as “Tiger.”13  Once “Tiger” was
secured, Vokes wanted the Seaforths to advance
and capture the next set of hills, known as
Canadian soldiers patrol the main street of Agira, July 1943.
Ph
ot
o 
by
 J
ac
k 
H
. S
m
ith
, N
AC
 P
A 
13
82
69
3
Delaney: Hoffmeister in his Proving Ground
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003
4“Grizzly.” Artillery concentrations on the
immediate objectives and air strikes on the town
of Agira in depth provided additional support
to weaken German resistance and “keep the
enemies’ heads down.”
For his part, Hoffmeister made efficient use
of the available time and resources to prepare
his battalion for battle. Shortly after receiving
his orders from Vokes at 0900 hours on 26 July,
he issued a “Warning Order”14  to initiate
preparations for battle. He advised his company
commanders that they were on two hours’ notice
to move their sub-units to an assembly area15
immediately west of Nissoria.16  In succession,
company, platoon and section commanders
passed on the direction, and soldiers shed
themselves of all but the essential weapons,
supplies and equipment. While these
administrative activities took place, Hoffmeister
completed his own tactical appreciation of the
mission and formulated his plan. By 1200 hours
he was ready to give orders.
Again, his plan – conveyed by verbal orders
– was uncomplicated. Supported by the direct
fire of tanks from a firm base on “Tiger,”
Hoffmeister would advance his battalion with
two companies forward; “A” Company (now
under command of Major “Budge” Bell-Irving)
would be north of the main road, while “C”
Company paralleled it to the south. Hoffmeister
anticipated that he and his tactical headquarters
would follow right on the heels of the lead
companies. Behind him, the reserve companies
– “B” and “D” – were to follow, astride the main
axis, ready for reinforcing or exploitation tasks.
Preparations for battle continued into the
afternoon.17 As Hoffmeister met with Brigadier
Vokes at 1500 hours, subordinate orders made
their way down the chain of command, from
company to platoon to section to individual
soldier. On his return, Hoffmeister issued a
quick set of confirmatory orders, before the
battalion left Assoro at 1600 hours. After a
relatively short route march, The Seaforths
arrived at Nissoria, complete and ready to enter
the fight, four hours later.18  In only 11 hours,
Hoffmeister had received his orders, formulated
a plan, disseminated that plan to a battalion of
700 men, and conducted a four-hour preliminary
move in preparation for battle. Concurrent with
these activities, companies “topped” up on
ammunition and water, troops ate and took
whatever rest they could, and the companies
integrated newly-arrived reinforcements.19  Drills
for the passage of information and the efficient
use of time were slick.
By the time the Seaforths arrived at the
western outskirts of Nissoria, the PPCLI was well
engaged with the enemy, and Vokes had a difficult
decision to make. Early reports had indicated
that the PPCLI had captured “Lion” and were
advancing on “Tiger”.20  Based on that, Vokes had
decided to commit the Seaforths to capture
Grizzly at 2300 hours. Unfortunately, the
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5situation bore no resemblance to what the PPCLI
reports had indicated. It was much worse. Not
only had the Patricias failed to secure “Tiger,”
they had not completely cleared “Lion” of
enemy,21  a fact that only became clear to Vokes
sometime between his decision to send the
Seaforths after “Grizzly” and midnight.
Understandably, the incomplete and conflicting
reports forced Vokes to rethink briefly his
decision to launch the Seaforths into the battle.
But he did not deliberate long. At midnight,
Vokes reconfirmed his bold call for the Seaforth
attack on “Grizzly.”22
Because Hoffmeister’s plan was simple, it
required little alteration, despite changes to the
tactical situation. Thus, with a minimum of fuss,
the Seaforths stepped off, commencing their
move through Nissoria at midnight. Once clear
of the city’s eastern limits, the battalion adopted
the same advance formation prescribed by
Hoffmeister in orders at noon on 26 July.23  But
few plans survive first contact with the enemy,
and this one was no exception. On the right flank,
“C” Company ran into rock-solid resistance and
became engaged in a firefight that lasted until
daybreak on 27 July. On the left, machine guns
and tanks near “Lion” halted Bell-Irving’s “A”
Company as well. Calmly, and on his own
initiative, Bell-Irving decided to use the hours
of darkness to bypass the immediate enemy at
“Lion”, and carry on to “Tiger” by a more
circuitous route.24  Unfortunately, as Bell-Irving
remembered, the company became completely
disoriented in the dark:
I was to say the least in a state of indecision
[while lost] – perhaps blue funk would be a better
phrase – not knowing where we were or what to
do – hoping the coy strung out behind us would
not sense my feeling….The Nebel [mortar] went
off almost right in my face….This forced
decision….[W]e turned right and made for the
high ground….The fact that this was our
objective was pure chance.25
By good luck and grace, the company
eventually had fumbled its way onto “Tiger” by
first light on 27 July and fought a spirited battle
to clear the objective of two German tanks and
a platoon of infantry.26
“A” Company scored a pivotal success. The
capture of “Tiger” unhinged the entire German
position north of the east-west road, forcing the
remaining enemy to withdraw. From atop their
objective, Bell-Irving and his soldiers could see
a “large number of Bosche infantry…moving
back from the North end of the ‘Lion’ feature in
an East then Northerly direction.”27
Unfortunately, all they could do was observe the
retreating Germans because Bell-Irving’s force
did not at that point have weapons with the range
to fire on them. On hearing this, Hoffmeister
Left: General Sir B.L. Montgomery invests Major H.P. Bell-Irving with the Distinguished Service Order for his actions at
“Grizzly” during the attack on Agira.  Right: Canadian jeeps pass a line of burnt-out German vehicles on the road
between Nissoria and Agira.
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6reinforced the position with the battalion anti-
tank platoon, artillery Forward Observation
Officers (FOOs), and, later, tanks to bring direct
and indirect fire on the enemy fleeing “Tiger.”28
Shortly thereafter, he added another rifle
company to consolidate “Tiger” and fend off any
enemy counterattack.
There is no evidence that Hoffmeister
considered pursuing the retreating enemy at this
point, and there are two reasons for this. First,
Simonds cast the 1 CID plan in the doctrinal
mold that called for attacks in stages, the
consolidation of gains, movement only from firm
bases,29 and the use of all available firepower to
support any resumption of the advance. This
thinking was part of the “bite and hold” that bit
and held both the Canadian and British
Armies.30  In a May 1943 letter to “All Comds
and COs 1 Cdn Div,” Simonds had emphasised
the importance of operating from firm bases.
Although he had stressed that it had “to be
impressed upon all troops that their objectives
[lie] inland and that the capture of the beaches
was only a means to an end,” the enemy
propensity for counterattack dictated a
deliberate approach:
[E]very operation must be launched from a firm
base – a tactical feature strongly held. During
an advance or attack successive objectives must
be firmly established. The sequence on reaching
an objective will be:
(a) Reorganize in tactical dispositions to suit
the ground.
(b) Patrol beyond the objective.
(c) Dig in.
(d) Using the objective as a firm base, seize
advantageous ground beyond or to the flanks.”31
Objectives were goals in themselves, not
necessarily means to ends. Pursuit operations
re-started advances, they were not occasions to
abandon the deliberate approach and seize
opportunities to rout retreating enemy before
they could regroup to fight another day.
Second, Hoffmeister was well aware that the
division plan called for an airstrike on the town
of Agira following the capture of “Tiger.” For that
reason, he sought Vokes’ permission to
“consolidate [on “Tiger”] in view of the Aircraft
program.”32  Given the friendly fire disaster of
Leonforte six days earlier,33  this was
understandable; pursuing the enemy, in view of
the planned air attack, would have exposed the
Seaforths to the bombs of the Desert Air Force.
Vokes agreed. To allow for the air attack on Agira
and keep his troops a safe distance from friendly
fire, the brigadier established a new “bomb
line”34  and passed it up the chain of command.
At 0740 hours he advised Hoffmeister: “Aircraft
will attack Agira. Stay at Tiger until 1200 hrs.”35
With that, Hoffmeister began planning the
next stage of the attack. At mid morning, he sat
on the heights of “Tiger,” surveying the ground
that led to “Grizzly” and Agira. It was an ideal
vantage point from which to make a plan and
pass on orders; but before he turned his full
attention to those tasks, he ordered that rations
be delivered for the tired and hungry soldiers of
his rifle companies. The human factors were as
important as the technical. Hoffmeister then
conducted a quick appreciation of the tactical
situation, made his plan and then held his orders
group36  at 1300 hours. Like his orders for the
first stage of the attack, these were simple, and
the ability of the company commanders to survey
the ground over which they would execute their
tasks made the conference a quick affair.
Hoffmeister commenced his orders at 1:00 pm
and the lead companies crossed the start line37
60 minutes later; it could not have taken him
more than 10 or 15 minutes to pass on his
plan.38  He called for another “two-up” assault.
“D” Company, advancing left forward, was to
capture “cemetery hill” north of Agira. “A”
Company, advancing right forward, was to seize
the “flat-topped” hill south of the main road. “B”
and “C” Companies were to be held in reserve,
to reinforce or exploit the efforts of the forward
companies, whichever was most appropriate. To
support the infantry assaults, artillery and air
attacks would “soften up” the objectives prior to
the advance.39  Then, once the advancing troops
commenced their move eastward, the direct fire
of machine guns, two squadrons of tanks, and
anti-tank weapons on “Tiger” would supplement
an artillery barrage to support them.
Again, however, enemy action forced quick
revisions to the original plan. Shortly after the
troops stepped off, extremely heavy fire from a
well-fortified enemy position on “cemetery hill”
halted “D” Company. Confirmation of this
development only reached Hoffmeister by runner
because mortar shrapnel had destroyed the
company commander’s wireless.40  Fortunately,
6
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7such slow means of message passing did not
cause any undue delay in decision-making.
Having watched the tactical situation develop
from a series of vantage points, and having
witnessed the volume of fire that spat out of
“cemetery hill,” Hoffmeister had already
ascertained that “D” Company’s objective was
too strong to be taken by a single company. Not
wanting to reinforce failure, he ordered Captain
E.W. Thomas to withdraw his company, and
reassigned him to a reserve task. The course of
events had, by this point, convinced Hoffmeister
to direct his main effort toward the right flank.
Bell-Irving’s “A” Company had advanced rapidly
to the base of the “Grizzly” feature. Leaving one
platoon to provide a firm base, Bell-Irving took
his other two platoons to the south, where they
scaled an undefended cliff and executed a
spectacular right flanking attack that caught the
enemy completely by surprise. “A” Company
routed the numerically superior German force,
killing 75 and taking 14 prisoners.41  It was a
tough fight, but by 1700 hours on 27 July, Bell-
Irving had consolidated the 50 remaining men
in his company on the southern tip of Grizzly
and was preparing for the inevitable German
counterattack.
“A” Company had created an opportunity and
Hoffmeister attempted a repeat of the rapid
reinforcement action that had been so successful
on “Tiger,” but the consolidation of “Grizzly”
proved much more difficult. At 1500 hours, he
had ordered “C” Company to outflank “Grizzly”
to the south and provide direct fire support to
“A” Company with anti-tank weapons.
Unfortunately, the going to the south proved
difficult and, to make matters worse, radio
communications soon failed, eliminating
Hoffmeister’s ability to quickly redirect “C”
Company straight onto “Grizzly.” That option out
of reach, Hoffmeister turned to his reserve, “B”
Company, which he hastily mounted in carriers
and launched toward the center of the objective;
but mortar and machinegun fire stopped it
cold.42  Compounding Hoffmeister’s frustration,
his fourth manoeuvre element, “D” Company,
was still out of radio contact and too far from
“A” Company to have an immediate impact on
the situation. Thus, it was an understandably
anxious Hoffmeister who scurried about the
battlefield, attempting to get a better picture of
the situation, and trying to reinforce “A”
Company. As darkness descended, what he had
perceived as an opportunity ripe for exploitation
was deteriorating into a problem of just “holding
on.”
Hoffmeister had few cards to play the night
of 27/28 July, but he played them with skill. Once
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8communications were re-established with “C”
Company, he ordered that sub-unit to continue
by way of a southern route to “Grizzly.” While
the weary troops of “C” Company plodded on by
way of a long right hook, Hoffmeister provided
what support he could to Bell-Irving’s little
bridgehead with direct and indirect fire. He
personally picked the artillery targets and, at
one point, he subjected the northern edge of the
“Grizzly” feature to a 30-minute concentration
of mortar fire to rid it of enemy.43  Mostly, and
much to his consternation, he waited.
The next morning, the situation improved.
After a night of sporadic German probes and
counter-attacks, Bell-Irving’s beleaguered force
was heartened by the arrival of a single and very
tired platoon from “C” Company. Bolstered with
these reinforcements, “A” Company attacked and
cleared the remainder of the “flat-topped hill”
feature, south of the main east-west road. By
0850 hours, 2 CIB controlled the objective.
Simultaneous with “A” Company’s success, The
Edmonton Regiment, which Vokes had
committed the previous day, took “cemetery hill”
from the north. The capture of “Grizzly” cleared
way for the PPCLI to enter Agira on the afternoon
of 28 July. The battle for Agira was over.
The assault on Agira was a 2 CIB triumph,
but it was Hoffmeister’s battalion that played the
major part in prying Agira from the enemy.
Despite a number of difficulties and strong
enemy resistance, the Seaforths had created
opportunities – on “Tiger” and on “Grizzly” – and
had enjoyed some success in exploiting them,
untidy though those victories may have been.
Two days after the battle, Hoffmeister marked
the regiment’s accomplishment when he had the
regimental Pipe Band beat the retreat through
the streets of the captured town, an event that
was broadcast round the world by the British
Broadcasting Corporation. For his part in the
battle, Hoffmeister received the Distinguished
Service Order, the citation of which reads:
For outstanding leadership which enabled the
Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, during two days
The Seaforth Highlanders pipe band playing “Retreat” in the main square of Agira, July 1943.
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9of fighting on 27/28 July 1943, to reach their
objective near AGIRA. During the final battle
communications were difficult. With complete
disregard for his own safety, this officer made
his way from Company to Company, under heavy
fire, and personally directed the attack.44
It should be noted, however, that
Hoffmeister’s accomplishments at Agira did not
come as a result of any tactical innovation or
doctrinal departure. In fact, his actions
conformed completely to higher plans and
reflected the doctrine that had been taught at
Staff College and practised in training: he limited
his objectives; he operated from firm bases; he
sequenced his attacks in phases; and he
consolidated his objectives before moving on to
exploit his gains. That Hoffmeister did not stray
far from established doctrine should come as
no surprise. He had only been in combat for just
over two weeks. But he was learning fast.
So was the rest of the Division. On 4 August,
Simonds suggested to Vokes that a “quick blow
[could] be struck” against crumbling enemy
resistance southwest of Mount Etna.45  With the
British 78th Division safely across the Salso
River near Adrano and Vokes’ battalions just
west of the TROINA River, Simonds rightly
surmised a sharp eastward thrust could seize
the high ground on the western bank of the
Simeto River and unhinge enemy defences
southwest of Mount Etna. Despite the exposed
left flank and enemy positions on Mount
Revisotto and Mount Seggio, Simonds believed
the potential pay-off of uncoupling the German
defences dictated that the division could “afford
to take bigger chances.” Besides, the undulating
ground of the Salso River Valley afforded good
protection against enemy observation and fire
from the north. This was a departure from the
doctrinal practice of establishing firm bases and
securing the flanks before commencing an
advance. So was the organization Simonds
proposed for the task. He suggested Vokes
assemble a “striking force” of “12 CTR [Canadian
Tank Regiment], One SP [self-propelled] Bty
[Battery], One or Two Tps [Troops] AT [Anti-
Tank] guns, one bn [battalion] of infantry, one
recce [reconnaissance] sqn [squadron]” under
Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Booth, the Commanding
Officer of 12th Canadian Tank Regiment (The
Three Rivers Regiment). Assets such as the
squadron from division reconnaissance
regiment, the Princess Louise’s Dragoon Guards
(PLDG) would be placed at Vokes’ disposal for
the operation. In the end, Vokes kept the anti-
tank battery and the self-propelled guns to
himself and grouped both the Seaforths and the
reconnaissance squadron under Booth.
The composition of “Booth Force” made
sense and took advantage of the capabilities of
the component arms, given the scattered enemy
and the nature of the terrain. The carrier-
mounted reconnaissance squadron could move
quickly in advance of the infantry and armour,
scanning the terrain for enemy. Tanks could
manoeuvre effectively in the open and undulating
country of the Salso river valley, and their
firepower could be used to support the
assaulting infantry by subduing enemy positions
from longer ranges. Infantry troops offered the
Canadian troops moving through the streets of Regalbuto, 6 August 1943.
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10 Tanks of a Canadian armoured unit rumble through the old-world streets of Regalbuto, Sicily.
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ability to operate in any type of terrain, thus
providing a degree of protection for the tanks,
but they moved at the pace of a foot soldier, not
an armoured vehicle. Simonds’ idea was a good
one, but the question of how to make it all work
still remained.
Booth and Hoffmeister developed practical
solutions, and quickly. Hoffmeister received his
orders for the operation at 0200 hours on 5
August, only four hours before the lead elements
were to cross the start line, the Troina River.46
To ensure the tanks could support the infantry
with direct fire and that the infantry could
protect the tanks from anti-tank weapons in
close terrain, they took two unorthodox actions.
First, Seaforth soldiers rode on the backs of the
tanks, through close country until they made
contact with the enemy. Although the infantry
were vulnerable in this mode of movement, it
did ensure that armour and infantry stayed
together, able to provide mutual support. It also
permitted the advance to take place at the pace
of tanks, not foot soldiers. And second, they
integrated communications to ensure a
continuous and reliable exchange of information
between infantry and armour. Hoffmeister
traveled in Booth’s tank while maintaining
communications with his rifle companies by way
of a radio strapped to the tank, and his own
tactical headquarters followed closely behind,
in the event that he had to dismount. Company
commanders did much the same, traveling with
the squadron commanders while remaining
“netted in” to their platoons.47
These arrangements contributed largely to
the success of the operation.48  After a two-and-
one-half hour delay due to bridging problems at
the Troina, “Booth Force” struck out towards
the Simeto River – the reconnaissance squadron
leading, followed by “C” and “A” Companies
(mounted on tanks), then Hoffmeister’s and
Booth’s headquarters, then “D” and “B”
Companies. Through the orange and lemon
groves of the Salso River valley, the force crashed
ahead at tank speed until it came to a “cement-
lined flume filled with water” at around 1100
hours.49  What was impassable to the tanks
without some engineering assistance was
relatively quick going for the infantry who
dismounted and waded across the flume
towards their objectives. Hoffmeister sent “C”
Company to the southwest side of the high
feature that dominated the Simeto. The troops
made it across the dangerous valley floor to the
slopes of the objective with the support of tanks
(sometimes firing over the heads of the
advancing infantry) and artillery.50  Like an
artillery barrage, tank fire kept enemy “heads
down” until the infantry scrambled close to the
enemy position; only tanks allowed the infantry
to get much closer. Tank rounds were more
accurate than artillery shells and they presented
less of a shrapnel hazard to advancing friendly
troops. Moreover, the close communications that
existed between squadron and company
commanders allowed the infantry to direct the
tank fire onto the most dangerous enemy
positions. That was how “C” Company made it
onto its objective, and much the same
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cooperation followed when Hoffmeister
reinforced “C” Company’s success with attacks
by “A” and “D” companies from southeast and
south respectively.51  The support was also
mutual. Because the Seaforths had scaled bluffs
impassable to tanks and fought an extremely
tough battle to clear the objective of enemy, the
tanks of “Booth Force” could dart to the Simeto
without fear of being engaged from the north.
The tactical arrangements developed by
Booth and Hoffmeister were not giant doctrinal
departures; some of them had been practised
on a limited scale before HUSKY.52  But they did
represent a closer level of all-arms cooperation
than had been practised to that point in the
Sicilian Campaign.53  The success of “Booth
Force” so convinced Simonds of the utility of
task-organized groups that he later used them
extensively during the 1 CID advances in
Southern Italy in September 1943. Like his
superiors, Hoffmeister, too, was learning much
in the summer of 1943. His willingness to try
new methods for all-arms cooperation, and the
jury-rigging of communications equipment to
support them, announced an increased
understanding of modern arms as well as a
heightened level of comfort with his own abilities.
Hoffmeister’s uniqueness lay in his direction
and control of the battle. His short, simple,
verbal orders furnished enough detail to allow
his subordinate commanders to accomplish
their tasks, but not so much as to stifle their
initiative. In short, he told his commanders what
to do, not how to do it.54  As Bell-Irving
commented: “T[he] performance [of “A” Company
at Agira] depended entirely on absolute freedom
of manoeuvre, freedom of time, and delegation
of initiative to subordinate officers.”55
Hoffmeister realized that victories in battle
German prisoners being marched into captivity by soldiers of
the Seaforth Highlanders north of Regalbuto, 4 August 1943.
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depended, to a large degree, on the performance
of his subordinates. At Agira, the key
subordinate was Bell-Irving.56  Hoffmeister also
made decisions quickly. Not all his tactical
decisions had the desired effect – the failure of
“B” and “C” Companies to reinforce “Grizzly,”
for example – but Hoffmeister’s penchant for
being well forward allowed him to assess the
situation as it developed and take rapid action.
In other words, before making a key tactical
decision he did not wait for information to come
to him, he went to it. This proved all the more
critical when communications failed. Quicker
decisions translated into quicker actions. He was
a technically sound battlefield manager.
Still, the question begs to be asked: What
made soldiers fight for 36 uninterrupted hours
and do extraordinary things? There were many
factors: group cohesion, the soldier’s aversion
to letting down his comrades, and the state of
individual training among them.57  But the very
human connection between the leader and the
led was also crucial. Consider the case of
Corporal Denis Meade, one of Hoffmeister’s
radio operators during the Battle of Agira. When
communications failed at a critical juncture in
the battle, on his own initiative and under mortar
fire, Meade set up his radio on a high feature
between Hoffmeister’s headquarters and the
companies that were out of radio contact. From
Lieutenant-Colonel B.M. Hoffmeister leads his battalion in the Sicilian Hills to
a parade ground for General Montgomery’s visit. Near Militello, Sicily, August 1943.
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there, he relayed messages between parties that
could speak to him, but not to each other. At
one point, after Meade had re-established
communications with Bell-Irving’s fatigued force
on “Grizzly,” Hoffmeister joined the radio
operator in his exposed position so that he could
speak directly to the commander of the isolated
company.58  Realizing that the young corporal
was alone and scared, Hoffmeister assured
Meade that he would send someone forward to
stay with him, which he later did. Then, before
leaving the radio relay position, Hoffmeister did
something that too few leaders do; he thanked
the soldier for his efforts. This affected Meade
profoundly. When asked why he took the action
that earned him the Military Medal, Meade’s
response was simple and heartfelt: “I didn’t want
to let him down.”59  That was the real key to
Hoffmeister’s success as a battalion commander;
he was able to make ordinary people do
extraordinary things.
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